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Rule Designs for Optimal Online Game Matchmaking
Mingkuan Xu, Yang Yu, and Chenye Wu
Abstract— Online games are the most popular form of enter-
tainment among youngsters as well as elders. Recognized as e-
Sports, they may become an official part of the Olympic Games
by 2020. However, a long waiting time for matchmaking will
largely affect players’ experiences. We examine different match-
making mechanisms for 2v2 games. By casting the mechanisms
into a queueing theoretic framework, we decompose the rule
design process into a sequence of decision making problems,
and derive the optimal mechanism with minimum expected
waiting time. We further the result by exploring additional
static as well as dynamic rule designs’ impacts. In the static
setting, we consider the game allows players to choose sides
before the battle. In the dynamic setting, we consider the game
offers multiple zones for players of different skill levels. In both
settings, we examine the value of choice-free players. Closed
form expressions for the expected waiting time in different
settings illuminate the guidelines for online game rule designs.
Index Terms— Queueing Theory, Matchmaking Mechanism,
Stochastic Process
I. INTRODUCTION
Long matchmaking waiting time can be a disaster for
online games. However, such situation is very common to
newborn or obsolete games with few players. Even players
with high ranks in popular games may experience long
waiting times, sometimes longer than the game time. For
example, public data from a League of Legends server [1]
shows that the average waiting time reaches up to 45 minutes
for the highest ranks, while League of Legends is a session-
based game with relatively short sessions, averaging around
34 minutes according to the game developers [2].
Conventional wisdom may suggest attracting more (high
quality) players to the game, which often involves huge in-
vestments on game designs. While such investments certainly
help, we focus on the rule design of games, which is the
other determinants of the game’s attractiveness. We submit
that a good rule design can significantly improve the game’s
attractiveness without any huge extra investment.
Figure 1 illustrates our decomposition of the whole rule
chain into a sequence of decision making problems. We
sequentially discuss the rule design of each component in
the rule chain and their combinations. Using a queueing the-
oretic framework, we seek to answer these decision making
problems and offer more insights on better rule designs for
online games.
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Fig. 1: The rule design for a 2v2 battle game.
A. Related Work
Most previous research on online game matchmaking
focuses on understanding the network latency’s impact. For
example, Agarwal et al. conduct the latency estimation for
matchmaking through geolocation and network coordinate
systems in [3]. Manweiler et al. extend the research to mobile
games in [4], where the network is much more unstable.
Surprisingly, the mathematical treatment for online game
matchmaking waiting time only emerges recently. Vron et
al. study user traces and analyze the influence of ranking on
the waiting time in [2]. Yuval et al. propose to define the
matchmaking cost regarding the matched requests and the
waiting time, and study the minimal cost perfect matching in
[5]. Malak and Deja examine the game structure’s impact on
matchmaking in [6]. Alman and McKay lay out theoretical
foundations for matchmaking, and propose a solution to
extract the fairest and most uniform games in [7].
B. Our Contributions
In contrast to previous works, we focus on understanding
the waiting time through a queueing framework, and we
seek to understand different rule designs’ impact on the
matchmaking mechanism. The principal contributions in this
paper can be summarized as follows:
• Decomposition of Rule Design: Based on the queueing
framework, we decompose the whole rule chain design
into a sequence of decision making problems. Such
decomposition allows us to discuss the rule design of
each component and their combinations, and thus to
identify bottleneck in rule designs.
• Optimal Matchmaking Mechanism: We use 2v2 battle
game to derive the optimal matchmaking mechanism.
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By comparing different service orders for diverse ar-
rivals, we submit that the optimal matchmaking mech-
anism is the packing service order and it is robust to
small network latency.
• Static Rule Design: We use choosing sides before
the battle as an example to highlight the impact on
static rule design to the matchmaking mechanism. We
find that allowing all players to choose sides yields
unbounded expected waiting time. This inspires us to
examine the value of choice-free players for the match-
making mechanism. We show that a small portion of
choice-free players can already guarantee a reasonable
expected waiting time.
• Dynamic Rule Design: As for the dynamic rule design,
we consider the game offers multiple zones for players
of different levels, and examine whether the game
designer should allow skilled players to battle in a junior
zone. Coincidentally, we refer to the skilled players who
are indifferent in the battle zones as choice-free players.
Being choice-free benefits themselves as well as the
whole system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces our system model and revisits the basic queueing
results for 2v2 battle games. By comparing different service
orders, we derive the optimal matchmaking mechanism in
Section III. Based on this optimal mechanism, we investigate
the impacts of static and dynamic rule designs in Section
IV and Section V, respectively. Section VI delivers the
concluding remarks and points out possible future directions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The matchmaking problem can be modeled in the queue-
ing framework. When a player starts to search for a game,
it joins the queueing system. Take 2v2 game as an example:
players can make a team with a friend and join the queueing
system together, or choose to join the system on their
own. Through the matchmaking mechanism, when there are
sufficient players (in the 2v2 game setting, four players are
sufficient), they may start a game and leave the queue.
A. Assumptions
To simplify our analysis and establish a stylized model,
we make the following assumptions:
1) The network latency is negligible.
2) The arrival process of players follows Poisson Process.
3) All players are identical regarding their skills.
Remark: We will relax the first assumption by examining
the matchmaking mechanism’s robustness to different service
orders. The last assumption guarantees that the players are
indifferent to their teammates as well as their rivals. In many
games, only players with the similar ranks can be matched
together, and our subsequent analysis can be generalized
to such cases straightforwardly. For other games, they may
need to take into account players’ self achievement when
designing the matchmaking, which is outside the scope of
0 1
λ
2
λ
· · ·
λ
k − 2
λ
k − 1
λ
λ
Fig. 2: The CTMC of the queueing system for k-player game.
this paper. This assumption allows us to focus on understand-
ing the waiting time in different matchmaking mechanisms,
and our conclusions can serve as the benchmark for general
online game matchmaking mechanism design.
In order to facilitate our understanding of the rule designs’
impact on matchmaking mechanisms, in this section, we
review the classical queueing theory results for two cases:
the k-player game, and the 2v2 battle game.
B. k-player Games
The first type of game is the most basic one, standard k-
player game. One example could be Mahjong game, which
involves four identical players. The simple matchmaking
mechanism waits for a total of k players and starts a game.
Denote the Poisson arrival rate of players by λ. Figure 2
shows the Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) of such
a k-player queue. By solving the balance equations, we can
prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For k-player games with Poisson arrival rate
λ, any matchmaking mechanism, which ensures that players
start a game as soon as there are at least k of them in
the queue, yields the same expected waiting time E[T ] as
follows:
E[T ]k-player =
k − 1
2λ
. (1)
Proof: It is sufficient to identify that the stationary probabil-
ity distributions are as follows
pi0 = pi1 = · · · = pik−1 = 1
k
. (2)
Then, Little’s Law [8] immediately yields the result. 
Remark: When the game only requires a single player, i.e.,
k = 1, our conclusion also holds. It simply degenerates to
the trivial case where there won’t be any queue in the system.
C. 2v2 Games
Another popular form of game involves battles, and can
often be modeled as a 2v2 game. One popular example could
be Clash Royale [9]. In such battle games, players can make
a team with a friend to join the battle, or just go on a quick
match by themselves.
Denote the individual arrival rate by λ1, and the team
(consisting of 2 players) arrival rate by λ2. Thus, the total
arrival rate of players into the queueing system is λtotal =
λ1 + 2λ2.
We seek to understand the average waiting time, denoted
by T , for all kinds of players. By analyzing the CTMC as
shown in Fig. 3, we can prove the following Lemma.
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Fig. 3: The CTMC of a 2v2 queue.
Lemma 2. For 2v2 games with total arrival rate λtotal with
λ1 > 0, any matchmaking mechanism, which starts a game
as soon as there are at least four players in the queue, enjoys
the same expected waiting time E[T ] as follows
E[T ]2v2 =
3
2λtotal
. (3)
Remark: When λ1 = 0, the 2v2 battle reduces to the 2-
player case. In this case, Lemma 2 won’t hold. Hence, we
require the additional condition λ1 > 0 to maintain the
structure of the 4-player game without degeneration.
D. Criteria for Rule Design
The rule design must consider the associated system
performance measured by the total expected waiting time,
and individual impacts assessed by the variance of waiting
time. While Lemma 2 is remarkable in guaranteeing the same
expected waiting time for all players, different matchmaking
mechanisms may yield diverse expected waiting time for
individual arrivals and the team arrivals. This leads us to
employ the variance of the waiting time for all arrivals as
the evaluation metric for different matchmaking mechanisms
before the static or dynamic designs are involved. Once
the rule designers begin to trade-off their choices for the
static and dynamic rule designs, the conditions of Lemma
2 no longer hold. Thus, both the system performance and
individual impacts are included as criteria for rule selection.
III. RULE DESIGN: THE BASICS
Experts in queueing theory may propose the most straight-
forward mechanism is First-In-First-Out (FIFO) central
queue system. However, from player’s point of view, we
submit the fairest but seemingly inefficient mechanism is to
divide individual arrivals and team arrivals into 2 different
queues. In this section, we first compare the central queue
with separate queue systems, then evaluate the performance
of matchmaking mechanisms with various service orders.
A. Central Queue or Two Queues?
The two-queue system is fair to players in that a team
of friends usually cooperate better than a team of 2 random
players. And the team players may even collude offline.
We denote the waiting time for individual arrivals by T1,
and that for team arrivals by T2. Such a two-queue system
divides the 2v2 game into a 4-player game with arrival rate
λ1 and a 2-player game with arrival rate λ2. Lemma 1
dictates
E[T1]2Q =
3
2λ1
, (4)
E[T2]2Q =
1
2λ2
. (5)
Based on E[T1]2Q and E[T2]2Q, standard mathematical ma-
nipulations yield
E[T ]2Q =
5
2λtotal
, (6)
Var[T ]2Q =
3λ21 − λ1λ2 + 11λ22
2λ2totalλ1λ2
. (7)
Remark: Obviously, in this straightforward yet fair mecha-
nism, fairness pays! The expect waiting time for all kinds of
arrivals is 67% more than the class of mechanisms considered
in Lemma 2. Later, we will use numerical studies to highlight
that the variance Var[T ]2Q is also significantly larger than
many other mechanisms.
B. Service Order for Central Queue
When there is only one central queue for the 2v2 game,
players are matched as soon as there are 4 players in the
queue. However, even with the Poisson arrival assumption,
there could be a non-negligible probability for 5 players
waiting in the queue: a team arrives when 3 players are
waiting in the queue. For the 3 players in queue, if there
is already a team, then we need to match the two teams
together for the new game since teams cannot be broken up.
Hence, the remaining hurdle is to choose a service order
for the case of 3 individual players in queue to conduct the
matchmaking. Possible service orders include:
1) FIFO: According to players’ arrival time, match the
first two individual players with the team.
2) Packing: Whenever there are two individual players in
the queueing system, pack them into a team. Thus, we
only need to match the teams in FIFO service order.
In our 2v2 game setting, it is equivalent to FIFO.
3) Last-In-First-Out, LIFO: In contrast to FIFO, LIFO
matches the last two individual players with the team
according to their arrival time.
Remark: It is straightforward to see that FIFO outperforms
LIFO. However, it is important to consider both service
orders due to network latency. Small network latency may
affect the true arrival orders of the players. Hence, evaluating
both service orders’ performance help us evaluate 2v2 battle
game’s sensitivity to service order and thus its sensitivity to
small network latency.
Note that Lemma 2 dictates the mean waiting time is the
same for all the three service orders:
E[T ]FIFO = E[T ]Packing = E[T ]LIFO =
3
2λtotal
. (8)
However, the CTMC in Fig. 3 does not contain enough
information for us to evaluate the waiting time variance
resulting from different service orders. Let states 2a and 3a
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Fig. 4: The CTMC for single queue 2v2 game.
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Fig. 5: The variances of waiting time with normalized λtotal.
denote that players in the queue are all individuals, and states
2b and 3b denote that there is a team in the queue. This leads
to a CTMC in Fig. 4. It is worth noting that all the three
service orders yield the same CTMC.
By solving stationary equations for this CTMC, we can
obtain desired evaluation metrics for the three service orders:
Var[T ]FIFO = Var[T ]Packing =
7λ21 + λ1λ2 + 4λ
2
2
2λ1(λ1 + λ2)3
− 2λ1λ
3
2 + 3λ
4
2
λ1λtotal(λ1 + λ2)4
− [E[T ]FIFO]2 , (9)
Var[T ]LIFO =
5λ31λ2 + 7λ
2
1λ
2
2 + 10λ1λ
3
2 + 2λ
4
2
2λ1(λ1 + λ2)3 (λ21 + 2λ1λ2 + 2λ
2
2)
+
8λ21 + 7λ1λ2
2(λ1 + λ2)4
− [E[T ]LIFO]2 . (10)
C. Performance Assessment and Rule Design
Figure 5 compares the variance of different matchmaking
mechanisms by normalizing λtotal to be one. The single queue
mechanisms all outperform the straightforward two queue
mechanism. Note that Var[T ]2Q reaches minimum at
λ1
λtotal
= 2
√
33− 11 ≈ 0.489. (11)
It is also worth noting that though it is straightforward to
argue FIFO and packing outperform LIFO service order, their
variances do not differ much. Thus, the optimal matchmak-
ing mechanism is central queue in FIFO/packing service
order, but the whole family of single queue matchmaking
mechanisms are insensitive to service orders (and hence
small network latency!) in the sense of reasonable waiting
time variances.
Remark: For games with more players, say kvk battle
games, it is more complicated to design the optimal match-
making mechanism. However, the intuition is that packing
would be a good choice when k is small. A relatively large
k may display the problem’s combinatorial nature in that
we need to solve a subset sum problem to decide which k
players to pack together whenever a new player arrives.
Having derived the optimal matchmaking mechanism, we
are ready to examine different rule designs’ impacts on the
matchmaking mechanism through the expected waiting time.
We are especially interested in two kinds of rule designs
for 2v2 battle game: allowing players to choose sides, and
allowing players to join 2 queues simultaneously in the 2-
queue matchmaking mechanism.
IV. STATIC RULE DESIGN: CHOOSING SIDES
In some 2v2 games, there could be possible differences in
all aspects of figures between the two battle sides. Players
may prefer one side than another. This leads to the first rule
design of our interest: it would be nice to allow players
to choose sides as this will obviously improve the players’
satisfaction to the game. However, this rule may inevitably
increase the expected waiting time for the game (Lemma 2
won’t hold with this additional rule!). We investigate these
trade-offs in this section.
In the basic model analyzed in the previous section,
there only exist finite possible states. However, once the
side selection is allowed, the state space can go to infinity.
Choosing sides sophisticates the rule design. This warrants
us exploring a simple but representative approximation of the
2v2 game. To obtain useful insights for rule design through
a neat analysis, in this work, we select the 1v1 game to
approximate the 2v2 game. The first subsection demonstrates
the conditions under which such approximation is accurate.
Then, we present insights obtained from the approximated
game, which is crucial for rule designs.
A. Approximation for 2v2 Game with Packing
The 2v2 game with packing service order can be viewed
as an 1v1 game by counting each package of 2 players as
a single arrival. However, such 1v1 game approximation
will not lead to a CTMC. This is because packing two
individual players makes the inter-arrival time distribution
non-exponential.
By normalizing λtotal to be 1, we plot the histograms for
the inter-arrival time of 1v1 game approximation with diverse
λ1’s in Fig. 6. We also compare the histograms with Poisson
arrival of the same total arrival rate. We can observe that,
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Fig. 6: Evaluate the inter-arrival time of 1v1 game approximation with diverse λ1’s with normalized λtotal (orange bins:
histograms for 1v1 game approximation, blue bins: histograms for Poisson process with the same total arrival rate).
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Fig. 7: The CTMC for allowing all players to choose sides.
the only hurdle preventing the distribution to be exponential
is the arrival of individual players. As λ1 increases, the 1v1
game approximation becomes more inaccurate.
Nonetheless, in the subsequent analysis, we stick to the
1v1 battle game approximation for the 2v2 battle game to
obtain more insights through analytical studies. We want to
emphasize that though our conclusions are only valid for
the case when the game attracts significantly more team
arrivals than individual arrivals, they provide useful intuition
for other cases as well.
B. Impacts of Proportions Having Preferred Side
The analysis on 1v1 game approximation reveals that the
proportion of players preferring one side, referred by the
players’ structure in the following sections, determines the
consequence of allowing side selection.
We first demonstrate the effects of the players’ structure by
the extreme case where we allow and require all the players
to choose a side of their favorites: namely either side A or
side B. Denote the arrival rate of players choosing side A
by λA, and that of players choosing side B by λB . To figure
out the CTMC, it suffices to identify its states: using integer
i is enough. For positive i, state i implies there are i players
choosing side A in the queue. For negative i, state i implies
−i players choosing side B. Figure 7 plots such a CTMC.
Unfortunately, this CTMC is quite classical in that it is
transient when λA 6= λB , and null recurrent when λA =
λB . Hence, even in the latter case, one can show that the
expected waiting time for all players is unbounded. Hence,
game designers cannot afford to allow all players to choose
sides freely.
However, introducing a small portion of choice-free play-
ers (who are indifferent in choosing sides) into the game can
inverse the conclusion. Denote the arrival rate of choice-free
players by λC . Figure. 8 plots the new CTMC.
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Fig. 8: The CTMC with choice-free players.
Fact 3. The CTMC in Fig. 8 is positive recurrent iff
λC > |λA − λB |. (12)
Remark: This is a straightforward yet remarkable fact. If
by design the two battle sides are balanced, i.e., λA and
λB do not differ much, then the game can afford allowing
more players to choose sides. In contrast, if the game is not
carefully designed, we may have to force many players to
take the side they don’t like. This will further reduce their
satisfaction to the game: a disaster to the game designer.
The above remark indicates that the valuable players
include not only the choice-free players but also the players
balancing the proportions of the two sides. Denote the wait-
ing time for players choosing side A, players choosing side
B, and choice-free players by TA, TB , and TC , respectively.
Solving the CTMC in Fig. 8 yields (see Appendix VII-A for
more details)
E[TA] =
(λB + λC)pi0
(λB + λC − λA)2 , (13)
E[TB ] =
(λA + λC)pi0
(λA + λC − λB)2 , (14)
E[TC ] =
pi0
λA + λB + λC
, (15)
where pi0 denotes the stationary probability at state 0. Denote
λtotal as the total arrival rate λA+ λB + λC into the system,
we have
pi0 =
(
λA
λB+λC−λA+
λB
λA+λC−λB + λCλ
−1
total + 1
)−1
.
With Eq. (13)-(15), we can further obtain the expected
waiting time for all players:
E[T ] =
1
2(λA + λC − λB) +
1
2(λB + λC − λA)
+
1
λA + λB + λC
− 1
2λC
− λA + λB + 2λC
2(2λAλB + λAλC + λBλC + λ2C)
.
(16)
To decipher Eq.(16), we normalize λtotal to be 1. Figure 9
examines how E[T ] varies with λA and λB . With normalized
λtotal, for any fixed λB , E[T ] hardly changes with λA as long
as λA < λB . In contrast, when λA > λB , E[T ] increases
sharply. Due to the symmetric nature of λA and λB to E[T ],
we conclude that max(λA, λB) dominates E[T ]. That is,
the benefit of being choice-free depends on the imbalance
between λA and λB . This can be further exemplified by
the improvement factor: we define improvement factor q as
follows:
q =
E[TC ]
E[TB ]
=
(λtotal − 2λB)2
λtotal(λtotal − λB) . (17)
Given λtotal = 1, we can further study the first order
derivative of q with respect to λB :
∂q
∂λB
=
1
(1− λB)2 − 4 < 0. (18)
This derivative is always negative in that we assume λB <
0.5λtotal. Hence, as λB increases (the two sides become more
symmetric), the improvement factor decreases, and decreases
slower!
However, E[T ] does not display such monotonicity with
respect to λB . Zooming in Fig. 9, we plot Fig. 10 to highlight
that though E[T ] is generally insensitive to the changes in
λA when λA < λB , increasing λA could first help reduce
the mean waiting time, then hurt the system performance!
C. Guideline for Rule Design
To sum up, it is crucial to evaluate players’ preference
distribution before the rule design. With a more symmet-
ric player preference distribution, the game could afford
more players to choose sides according to their preferences.
However, this issue raises a very important future work:
players’ preference may change over time, and thus the
ideal rule game could be somewhat dynamic. Hence, it is
important to establish an adaptive rule design to constantly
track the changes in players’ preference distribution. Also,
the mechanism design of attracting players balancing the
sides also deserves carefully explorations.
V. DYNAMIC RULE DESIGN: CLIMBING THE LADDER
We have focused on the static analysis for the 2v2 battle
game in the sense that we assume all players are identical
across time. In this section, we consider a dynamic setting
to allow the players to have different levels. This is true for
many games: players start from the beginner level and can
only play in a junior zone. When their skills climbing up to a
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Fig. 9: The expected waiting time with normalized λtotal.
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Fig. 10: E[T ] with normalized λtotal and λB = 0.4.
higher level, they are allowed to play in the advanced zone1.
Though in practice, there could be more zones for a game.
We restrict ourselves to the two-zone scenario for analytical
solutions.
A. Battle in Both Zones: the Formulation
One straightforward rule design problem could be to
decide the level to distinguish the players for two zones.
However, such a decision making problem heavily depends
on concrete game setting. In this section, we turn to another
decision making problem: some games allow the experienced
players to battle in the junior zone while others don’t. In
terms of the expected waiting time, how much would it help
to allow the experienced players to battle in both zones?
We follow the 1v1 game approximation in this section to
enable us focus on understanding the dynamic rule design’s
impact on matchmaking. In such a setting, there are 3 types
of arrivals, green players for Zone A (the junior zone) arrives
with rate λA, experienced players only for Zone B (the
advanced zone) arrives with rate λB , and experienced players
for both zones (choice-free players) arrives with rate λC .
However, this is not enough to formulate the CTMC. It
remains undecided when a choice-free experienced player
joins the two queues and finds that both queues are non-
empty. For simplicity, we employ the FIFO service order to
deal with such situations. That is, match the new arrival with
the player who arrives first (In fact, before the new arrival,
there are exactly two players in the system, and one in each
1One concrete example could be the game Majsoul [10]. There are 5
arenas: Bronze, Silver, Gold, Jade and Throne Arena. Players are allowed
to battle in different arenas according to their levels in the game.
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Fig. 11: CTMC for dynamic rule design in FIFO order.
queue). We use state 0 to indicate there is no player in either
queue, and use states A, B, and C to indicate from state 0,
the new arrival is a green player for Zone A, experienced
player for Zone B, and choice-free player for both zones,
respectively. We denote the state when the player queueing
in Zone A arrives first by state AB. In contrast, we denote
the corresponding state when the player queueing in Zone B
arrives first by state BA. With these notations, we plot the
CTMC in Fig. 11.
Solving this CTMC, Little’s Law dictates that (see Ap-
pendix VII-B for more details)
E[TA]=
2λAλB+λAλC+2λ
2
B+4λBλC+λ
2
C
(λA+λC)(λB+λC)(λA+λB+λC)
pi0, (19)
E[TB ]=
2λAλB+λBλC+2λ
2
A+4λAλC+λ
2
C
(λA+λC)(λB+λC)(λA+λB+λC)
pi0, (20)
E[TC ] =
pi0
λA + λB + λC
, (21)
where pi0 is the stationary distribution for being at state 0.
Using the law of total probability, we can obtain the expected
waiting time for all arrivals:
E[T ] =
λAE[TA] + λBE[TB ] + λCE[TC ]
λA + λB + λC
. (22)
B. Benefits of Being Choice-Free
To understand the benefits for experienced players of being
choice-free, we define the improvement factor q as follows:
q=
E[TC ]
E[TB ]
=
(λA + λC)(λB + λC)
2λ2A+2λAλB+4λAλC+λBλC+λ
2
C
. (23)
Obviously, q measures how much it saves the experienced
players to start a game by joining two queues, instead of
sticking to the advanced zone. To obtain more insights, note
that when λA = λB , we have
q =
λB + λC
4λB + λC
. (24)
That is, when λA = λB , the benefit for the first experienced
player to switch to a choice-free player is to save 75%
expected waiting time! As the number of choice-free players
increases, such benefit diminishes.
Fig. 12: The improvement factor q vs. λA and λC .
Fig. 13: E[T ] vs. λA and λB with normalized λtotal.
As Fig. 12 illustrates, when λC = 0, and λtotal = 1,
q = 0.5(1− λA), (25)
which implies that the initial benefit of being choice-free
solely depends on λA! When the junior zone is already
crowded compared to the advanced zone, then there is no
incentive for being choice-free.
Besides the intuitions, we can further conclude that q
increases rapidly (and hence the benefit decreases rapidly)
as λA decreases (fewer junior players). In fact, the maximal
benefit of being choice-free could save the players up to 90%
of expected waiting time when λA = 0.8 and λB = 0.2.
The system also benefits from the existence of choice-
free players, as shown in Fig. 13. The more the choice-free
players more, the lower the expected total waiting time is.
However, the marginal system value of additional choice-free
player decreases. Nevertheless, the proportion of choice-free
players in the total population determines whether the game
designers should allow the players to select the battle zone
according to their own preferences.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we focus on the optimal matchmaking
mechanisms for 2v2 battle game. Using the 1v1 game
approximation to the packing service order, we analyze both
the static rule design as well as the dynamic rule design’s
impact on the matchmaking mechanisms. We submit that in
both cases, choice-free players are vital to the system: being
choice-free benefits themselves as well as the whole system.
Much remains unknown. The CTMC for games with
more players are more complicated, and it is hard to obtain
analytical insights. Also, in this paper, our goal for the game
rule design is to minimize the expected waiting time. How-
ever, in practice, many more aspects concerning the player’s
satisfaction to the game need to be carefully examined.
It would be also interesting to consider more dynamic
scenario when players’ preference distribution, and players’
level distribution change over time. This inspires us to
construct more adaptive rule designs in the future.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. E[T ] for static rule design
Observe the time-reversibility equations:
λApi0 = (λB + λC)pi1
λApi1 = (λB + λC)pi2
· · ·
λBpi0 = (λA + λC)pi−1
λBpi−1 = (λA + λC)pi−2
· · ·
λCpi0 = (λA + λB + λC)pi1′ .
We define the following two series for z-transforms:
N̂1(z) =
∑∞
i=1
piiz
i, (26)
N̂2(z) =
∑∞
i=1
pi−izi. (27)
The time-reversibility equations imply
λAzN̂1(z) + λApi0z = (λB + λC)N̂1(z), (28)
λBzN̂2(z) + λBpi0z = (λA + λC)N̂2(z). (29)
Having obtained the closed form expressions for N̂1(z) and
N̂2(z), we can derive the z-transform for the stationary
distributions N̂(z) via
N̂(z) = N̂1(z) + N̂2(z) + pi1′z + pi0. (30)
We submit that
E[TA] =
(
N̂1
′
(1) + N̂1(1) + pi0
)
· 1
λB + λC
, (31)
E[TB ] =
(
N̂2
′
(1) + N̂2(1) + pi0
)
· 1
λA + λC
, (32)
E[TC ] = pi0(λA + λB + λC)−1. (33)
Law of total probability leads to E[T ]:
E[T ] =
λAE[TA] + λBE[TB ] + λCE[TC ]
λA + λB + λC
. (34)
Standard mathematical manipulation yields the desirable
results. 
B. E[T ] for dynamic rule design
Denoting λtotal = λA+λB+λC , it suffices to identify the
balance equations for the CTMC are as follows:
λtotal · pi0 = λtotal · piC+(λA+λC)piA+(λB+λC)piB
λtotal · piA = λApi0 + λBpiAB + (λB + λC)piBA
λtotal · piB = λBpi0 + λApiBA + (λA + λC)piAB
λtotal · piAB = λBpiA
λtotal · piBA = λApiB
λtotal · piC = λCpi0.
It is straightforward to verify the following stationary distri-
butions are the solution to the above balance equations:
piA = λApi0(λA + λC)
−1, (35)
piB = λBpi0(λB + λC)
−1, (36)
piAB = λAλBpi0(λA + λC)
−1λ−1total, (37)
piBA = λAλBpi0(λB + λC)
−1λ−1total, (38)
piC = λCpi0λ
−1
total. (39)
We take E[TA] as an example to illustrate how to obtain
our desirable results. Let fi denote the expected remaining
waiting time for junior players (with arrival rate λA) when
the system is at state i. With such definitions, we can express
E[TA] as follows:
E[TA] = pi0fA + pi2fBA. (40)
Hence, it suffices to derive fA and fBA. By definition of the
fi’s, law of total probability yields
fA = λ
−1
total + λBfABλ
−1
total, (41)
fAB = λ
−1
total + λBfAλ
−1
total, (42)
fBA = λ
−1
total + (λB + λC)fAλ
−1
total. (43)
Solving this system of equations immediately leads to E[TA].
Other results can be derived in the same routine. 
